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Direct democracy has experienced a remarkable renaissance in recent decades. The recent
referendums on the new European constitution in France, the Netherlands and Ireland are
just one prominent example. Direct voter participation is also increasingly popular in Ger-
many￿ s local politics; and its introduction is debated in countries like the Netherlands, South
Africa and even the European Union itself.
The popularity of direct democracy is fueled in part by the belief that direct voter con-
trol could slow down or even reverse the rapid growth in government spending over the
past decades.1 To evaluate the merit of the arguments and policy proposals favoring direct
participation requires ￿rst a clear understanding of how direct democracy in￿ uences public
policies. Our goal in this article is to identify the causal e⁄ect of direct democracy on public
spending. Speci￿cally, we analyze two questions: does direct democracy reduce government
spending? And how does direct democracy a⁄ect the vertical structure of government?
In a representative democracy, incentives of elected politicians might not always be
aligned with the preferences of voters. Reasons are politicians￿career concerns to gain more
political in￿ uence, lobbying by special interests for projects or log-rolling in the legislature.
As a consequence, politicians often pursue larger governments than desired by the median
voter (Peltzman, 1992).
Economic theory suggests two channels why referendums and initiatives bring actual
policies closer in line with the preferences of the median voter. First, initiatives can be
used as a threat point to limit spending by elected representatives (Gerber, 1996; Moser
2000). Referendums are a somewhat weaker tool because governments decide what citizens
1Other arguments advanced in favor of direct voter participation are that citizens may be more satis￿ed if
they can in￿ uence political a⁄airs. Or, political decision-making and the quality of government may improve
because representatives are better informed and controlled by voters.
2vote on (Romer and Rosenthal 1979). Second, initiatives and, to some degree, referendums
allow citizens to select their preferred policy. Parliamentary or presidential elections require
citizens to elect a candidate, each of them representing a whole bundle of policy proposals.
Hence, the choice of the legislature on any single issue might be very di⁄erent from the actual
preferences of the median voter (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Besley and Coate, 2002).
Both channels imply that access to direct democratic institutions reduces public spending
if voters are more ￿scally conservative than politicians (e.g. Peltzman, 1992). How direct
democracy a⁄ects the vertical structure of government is not obvious. It might increase
spending at lower levels of government if voter constraints shift public services to lower levels
of government. It might decrease spending if budgetary constraints also reduce resources for
local governments.
We are not the ￿rst to study the role of direct democracy; an extended literature has
analyzed its link to public spending. Previous studies typically report a large negative corre-
lation between direct democracy and spending at the same level of government; and a large
positive correlation with spending at lower levels of government.2 Such results are, however,
di¢ cult to interpret since they are predominantly based on cross-sectional variation. Direct
democratic institutions, like most institutions laid down in a country￿ s constitution, rarely
change over time. Even if based on panel data, models using cross-sectional variation su⁄er
from two unavoidable biases: an inability to control for di⁄erent preferences for government
and the omission of other institutional factors that constrain politicians. Both of these bi-
ases are likely to exaggerate the e⁄ect of direct democracy on spending at the same level of
government and possibly for lower levels of government.3 These confounding factors pose
2Bails and Tieslau (2000), Besley and Case (2003), Farnham (1989), Matsusaka (1995; 2000; 2004) and
Zax (1989) for the United States; Feld and Matsusaka (2003), Feld, Schaltegger and Schnellenbach (2008),
Feld and Kirchg￿ssner (2001), and Pommerehne (1978), among others, for Switzerland.
3Funk and Gathmann (2008), for instance, show that voters in direct democratic cantons are ￿scally more
3a major challenge to interpret the correlations as causal (see e.g. Besley and Case, 2000;
Konrad, 2001).
We propose an alternative approach to identify the causal e⁄ect of direct democracy on
public spending.4 We collected a new historical data set for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to
today. Over this long horizon, we observe substantial variation in direct democratic institu-
tions which we coded by carefully examining each canton￿ s past and present constitutions.
Hence, we can for the ￿rst time control for all permanent di⁄erences across cantons by in-
cluding Canton ￿xed e⁄ects. The ￿ndings demonstrate that unobserved heterogeneity is
important. We also control directly for di⁄erential changes in the demand for government
across cantons. Our measure of preferences is derived from actual voting behavior in all
federal propositions held since 1890. Finally, we address the potential endogeneity of direct
democratic institutions with instrumental variables. Changes in direct democratic institu-
tions require a revision of the constitution. Hence, a candidate instrument is the provision
for the constitutional initiative which allows for citizens to amend the constitution. We
contribute to a small, but growing literature that uses instrumental variables to address in-
stitutional endogeneity at the state level (Knight, 2000; Rueben, 1997).5 Our study is unique
because we can combine instrumental variables with ￿xed e⁄ects to rigorously address the
potential endogeneity of institutions.
We show three main results: ￿rst, direct democracy has a constraining, yet moderate
conservative. Since the usually employed socio-economic characteristics do not fully capture heterogeneity
in voters￿￿scal preferences, previous estimates of direct democratic institutions are too large.
4Likewise, Petterson-Lidbom and Tyrefors (2007) use a regression-discontinuity design to compare spend-
ing in communities with town meetings to those with purely representative forms of government. Olken
(2008) uses an experimental design to study popular decision-making over public goods and satisfaction in
Indonesia.
5There is a large literature using instrumental variables for other types of institutions in a cross-country
setting. See for example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001); Acemoglu and Johnson (2005); Hall and
Jones (1999); Persson and Tabellini (2003; 2004).
4e⁄ect on canton spending. Our ￿xed e⁄ect estimates suggest that the mandatory budget
referendum reduces canton spending by 3.4 percent. An increase in the signature requirement
for the voter initiative by one percent (of the eligible population) raises expenditures by
0.5 percent. Our estimates are several times smaller than the cross-sectional correlations
reported in previous studies.
Second, periods of high spending increase the likelihood of stricter voter control over the
budget. To solve the endogeneity issue, we use the constitutional initiative as an instrument.
Historical examples illustrate that direct democracy has frequently been shaped by the con-
stitutional initiative. We present both anecdotal and formal evidence that the constitutional
initiative is plausibly exogenous from the spending regression. The instrumental variable
estimates show that the budget referendum decreases canton governments by 9 percent.
In addition, a one percent lower signature requirement for the initiative decreases canton
spending by 2.2 percent.
Third, we ￿nd no evidence that direct democracy at the canton level shifts spending to
the local level or generates a more decentralized government. If anything, stronger direct
democracy reduces spending both at the canton and local level. Hence, we ￿nd the exact
opposite of the large positive correlations reported in the cross-sectional literature. We
conclude from this that the role of direct democracy for the vertical structure of government
is limited.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide background information
on direct democracy in Swiss cantons. We describe our new historical data set in section 3.
The ￿xed e⁄ect estimates and various robustness tests are reported in section 4. In section
5, we use instrumental variables to identify the causal e⁄ect of the referendum and initiative
on the size of government. Section 6 concludes.
52 Direct Democracy and Fiscal Policy in Switzerland
Switzerland, with its long tradition of direct democratic participation, provides a unique
setting for our analysis. Switzerland has a strong federalism structure in which cantons play
a prominent role. All political rights and responsibilities rest with the cantons, unless they
concede a right or responsibility to the federal government through a nationwide referendum.
As a consequence, cantons have a lot of autonomy to provide public goods or services and
to redistribute wealth. Cantons made 34 percent of all government expenditures in 1998,
compared to 39 percent by the federal government and 27 percent by local governments.
Revenues are equally decentralized.
Direct democracy has always played a dominant role in Swiss politics (Curti, 1900; Trech-
sel and Serd￿lt, 1999; Vatter 2002). The referendum and voter initiative (Begehren) for a
revision of the federal constitution have been in place since the Swiss Confederation was
founded in 1848 (K￿lz, 1992). Direct participation of citizens in town meetings goes back in
some cantons like Appenzell, Glarus or Uri to the thirteenth and fourteenth century. The
right to propose new laws through initiatives was in place in Glarus, Vaud and Nidwalden
already by 1850.
The direct democratic institutions most relevant for ￿scal policy are the budget referen-
dum and the voter initiative. In a budget referendum, citizens approve or reject government
projects if the one-time or recurring expenditures exceed a certain monetary threshold. In
principle, budget referendums may cover public expenditures, public sector bonds, taxes,
enterprise holdings or real estate.6 We restrict attention to budget referendums on public
6The budget referendum we analyze here is most closely related to budget or project-based referendums
of local school districts in the United States. An institution related to the referendum on tax increases are
legal tax and expenditure limitations, commonly found in the United States (see Bohn and Inman, 1996;
Poterba, 1994; Rueben, 1997; Von Hagen, 1991) and more recently in Switzerland (Feld and Kirchg￿ssner,
2001).
6expenditures because they are by far the most common. Between 1980 and 1999 alone,
citizens voted on 461 expenditure referendums; they approved 86 percent of the proposed
projects (Trechsel and Serd￿lt, 1999).
At present, ￿fteen cantons have a mandatory budget referendum in place. It requires
citizens to vote on all projects that exceed a certain monetary threshold.7 Ten cantons only
allow an optional budget referendum. Here, citizens need to collect between 100 and 10,000
signatures to vote on a large spending project. Control over the budget is stronger in cantons
with mandatory budget referendum because voter approval is mandated by law. If voters
are ￿scally more conservative than politicians, we expect a mandatory budget referendum
to decrease government spending.8
The voter initiative, in contrast, allows citizens to propose entirely new laws, for example,
limits on spending growth. Most cantons adopted the voter initiative several decades prior
to the beginning of our study period in 1890. We have, however, substantial variation in
the number of signatures required to get an initiative on the ballot: in 2000, Glarus requires
only a single signature, while Vaud requires 12,000 signatures. The costs of collecting 12,000
signatures are higher for the electorate than collecting a single signature. Low costs to launch
an initiative increases voters in￿ uence over political decisions; high signature requirements,
in contrast, reduce the political in￿ uence of voters. If voters prefer less spending than
politicians, higher signature requirements should increase government spending.
7Thresholds for non-recurring expenditures range between 25 Million Swiss Francs (SFr) in Lucerne and
250,000 SFr in Schwyz (1999). This implies that a project of on average 6.8 million SFr or just less than
1 percent of average expenditures mandates a referendum. For recurring expenditures, thresholds range
between 50,000 (Appenzell-Innerrhode, Basle County, Nidwalden, Ticino and Uri) and 400,000 SFr (Berne).
8Several cantons allow for a mandatory and optional budget referendum (Zurich, Lucerne, Uri, Obwalden,
Nidwalden, Fribourg, Solothurn, Scha⁄house, Appenzell-Innerrhode, St. Gallen, Grisons, and Thurgau). A
comparison of cantons with both referendum forms to cantons with only an optional or no budget referendum
provides a lower bound of a comparison of cantons with a mandatory budget referendum relative to no
referendum (see Feld and Matsusaka, 2003).
7Budget referendum and voter initiative are alternative tools for citizens to shape bud-
getary decisions. The two instruments di⁄er in both scope and costs for the voter: in a budget
referendum, citizens are restricted to approve or dismiss individual spending projects. With
a voter initiative, citizens have more leverage over the budget; they can, for example, pro-
pose spending limitations for future budgets. This in￿ uence, however, comes at a cost. An
initiative is more costly for the voter than a referendum mandated by law since they need
to prepare an initiative and collect the necessary signatures. Hence, it is an open question
whether referendums or initiatives are more e⁄ective in constraining the size of government.
Table 1 provides an overview of the direct democratic institutions in 2000. The cantons
with a mandatory budget referendum are shown in column (2); column (4) lists the number
of signatures required to bring an initiative on the ballot.9 Note that the direct democratic
institutions are positively correlated: cantons with a mandatory budget referendum often
have lower signature requirements as well (correlation coe¢ cient: -0.18). Figure 1 illustrates
the geographic variation in direct democratic institutions across Swiss cantons. In general,
direct democracy is stronger in the German-speaking parts of Switzerland: these include the
large urban centers of Basle, Zurich or Berne and the more rural interior. The French- and
Italian-speaking cantons in the South and West, in contrast, have weaker direct democratic
institutions.
Institutions like direct democracy exhibit a strong persistence over time. A unique feature
of our long panel is that we observe substantial variation in both the budget referendum and
signature requirement over our 110 years period. Columns (3) and (5) in table 1 show that
twelve cantons adopt the mandatory budget referendum and nine cantons abolish it in favor
9The canton Jura was founded in 1978 and is excluded from the analysis.
8of an optional referendum. Six cantons adopt the voter initiative after 1890.10 Also, nineteen
cantons increase their signature requirement for the voter initiative and four cantons reduce
it.
3 A New Historical Dataset
We collected a new dataset for all twenty-￿ve cantons in Switzerland between 1890 and 2000.
First, we extracted comprehensive measures of direct democratic institutions in each canton
from all past and current constitutions as well as the relevant canton laws. In addition, we
used published sources to validate and cross-check our coding of the institutional variables
(K￿lz, 2004; Monnier, 1996; Ritzmann-Blickernstorfer, 1996; Trechsel and Serd￿lt, 1999;
Vatter, 2002). If in doubt, we contacted the respective cantonal Public Record O¢ ces
(Staatsarchive) to clarify any inconsistencies.
We measure direct democratic institutions by two variables: a binary indicator equal
to one if a canton has a mandatory budget referendum in place; the variable is zero if the
canton allows only an optional or no budget referendum in a certain year. For the voter
initiative, we use the number of signatures required to get an initiative on the ballot.11 The
variable is expressed in percentage of eligible voters; hence, we assume that the collection
of 1,000 signatures is more costly in a canton with only 5,000 citizens than in a canton
with 100,000 citizens.12 Since the number of eligible voters changes over time, the signature
requirement for the voter initiative varies in addition to changes in the absolute number of
10Geneva in 1891, Ticino in 1892, Berne in 1893, Lucerne in 1906, Valais in 1907 and Fribourg in 1921.
11We assigned an arbitrary signature requirement for cantons that adopted the voter initiative after 1890.
Fortunately, estimates remain unchanged whether we choose a signature requirement of 20, 30, 50 or 100
percent for non-adopters. The results reported in the paper use the 30 percent signature requirement.
12Alternatively, we could assume that the cost of collecting signatures is ￿xed. In that case, the absolute
number of signatures is the relevant statistic. We report that result in the robustness section.
9required signatures.
We add to this information detailed statistics on public ￿nances and socio-demographic
characteristics. For each canton, we digitized printed information contained in the Statistical
Yearbook of Switzerland, the Historical Statistics of Switzerland and information from the
decennial Census. The data appendix provides a detailed description of the data sources
and the construction of variables. Our main outcome variables are annual expenditures
and revenues per capita as well as total expenditures per capita by local governments. All
expenditure and revenues variables are de￿ ated to 2000 Swiss Francs. To analyze whether
direct democracy decentralizes public spending, we also measure spending centralization; the
measure is constructed as the percentage of local and canton expenditures that is spent at
the canton level.
Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of all variables separately for cantons
with and without a mandatory budget referendum. The last column reports the t-statistic for
equality of means across the two groups. In the raw data, canton expenditures and revenues
(in logs) are not statistically di⁄erent between cantons with and without a mandatory budget
referendum. However, cantons with a mandatory budget referendum have signi￿cantly higher
local spending and less centralized expenditures.
Cantons with stronger direct democracy also di⁄er in their political structure from other
cantons. They have a lower signature requirement for the voter initiative and a smaller
executive. In addition, they are more likely to have a mandatory law referendum in place
and less likely to elect their parliaments using proportional representation. Cantons with
a mandatory budget referendum are more likely to have adopted de￿cit or debt limitations
but are equally likely to have a balanced budget rule anchored in their constitution.
One control variable that is not available in our data set is canton income. Income
10becomes available only in the 1960s. We use several variables to control for di⁄erences in
wealth in our empirical analysis: the overall labor force participation rate, percentage of
car ownership, number of doctors per capita and infant mortality rate. Together, these
four variables account for 47 percent of the variation in canton income since 1965.13 Once
we include our other control variables like the share of employment in manufacturing and
agriculture, the age structure of the population, the share of the urban population and canton
and year ￿xed e⁄ects, we account for 93 percent of the variation in canton income. Hence,
the absence of a precise measure of canton income is not a major limitation of our study.
We now turn to our main results.
4 Direct Democracy and Fiscal Policy: Fixed E⁄ects
4.1 Canton Expenditures and Revenues
The descriptive statistics made clear that cantons with strong direct democratic institutions
have di⁄erent observable characteristics than cantons with weaker direct democracy. Hence,
it is likely that cantons also di⁄er along other, unobservable dimensions. Surely, demograph-
ics and other determinants of the demand for government are likely to change over a 110
years period. Our detailed study of the canton constitutions, however, revealed other dif-
ferences that are persistent over time. In some cantons, for instance, citizens can recall the
executive or select the president of the executive in direct elections. The ￿rst increases the
control of citizens over politicians, while the second strengthens the position of the president
relative to the legislature and executive (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Both institutions are
13Car ownership would not be a good proxy for income if it was more heavily used in agriculture and
hence, in the poorer, rural areas. In Switzerland, however, this is not the case: the correlation between car
ownership and urbanization is strong and positive.
11more prevalent in cantons with strong direct democracy. Omitting these factors, we would
overestimate the true e⁄ect of direct democracy on public spending.14
A unique feature of our long panel is that we can control for all permanent di⁄erences
across cantons using ￿xed e⁄ects. In particular, we estimate the following empirical model:
logYct = ￿ + ￿Referendumct + ￿Initiativect + ￿
0Xct + tt + ￿c + "ct (1)
where the subscript c denotes the canton and t the year. LogYct is expenditures or revenues
measured in logs, Xct denotes other control variables, tt and ￿c the year and canton ￿xed
e⁄ects. "ct is assumed to be an iid error term re￿ ecting measurement error in expenditures
or revenues. The main parameters of interest are ￿ and ￿; they capture the e⁄ect of the
budget referendum and signature requirement on expenditures or revenues. Based on our
discussion above, we expect that ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 0:
Table 3 shows the basic results with annual expenditures per capita (in logs) as the
dependent variable.15 Including only year dummies, the ￿rst speci￿cation shows a strong
negative relationship between the mandatory budget referendum and government spending.
A higher signature requirement for the voter initiative is negatively correlated with can-
ton expenditures. The second column adds our set of variables to control for observable
di⁄erences across cantons. The coe¢ cient on the budget referendum drops to 9.3 percent.
An increase in the signature requirement by one percent is now associated with 0.4 percent
higher spending as expected.
14Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is also important because ￿scal policy and political institutions
vary substantially between German- and French- or Italian-speaking cantons; these di⁄erences persist even
after controlling for a large number of observable canton characteristics.
15We choose the log speci￿cation for several reasons: ￿rst, cantonal expenditures are log normally dis-
tributed. Second, spending 1,000 Swiss Francs weighs more if the overall budget is smaller. Third, the log
speci￿cation allows a simple interpretation of the coe¢ cient on the institutional variable. Results using the
level of spending were similar and available upon request.
12Our preferred speci￿cation in column (3) accounts for all permanent unobservable di⁄er-
ences across cantons. The coe¢ cients are now identi￿ed from cantons that adopt or abolish a
mandatory budget referendum or change their signature requirement for the voter initiative.
The ￿xed e⁄ects are statistically highly signi￿cant (see the bottom of table 3) and change the
main coe¢ cients substantially. The budget referendum reduces total spending by only 3.4
percent. A higher signature requirement by one percent raises expenditures by 0.5 percent.
The large drop in the coe¢ cient of the budget referendum with canton ￿xed e⁄ects might
be the result of spending di⁄erences between cantons that change their provisions for the
budget referendum and those that do not (see table 1). However, we ￿nd no evidence for
any spending di⁄erences: mean log expenditures for cantons without changes in their budget
referendum are 7.19 while log expenditures are 7.16 for cantons that adopt or abolish the
budget referendum over our study period.
Is the picture similar on the revenue side? The ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation in column (6)
shows no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences in revenues between cantons with and without
mandatory budget referendum. The result suggests that cantons without a mandatory bud-
get referendum ￿nance their higher public expenditures in part by running de￿cits. An
increase in the signature requirement by one percent is associated with 0.6 percent more
revenues.
The control variables have largely the expected sign in the expenditure and revenue
regressions. For instance, cantons with lower infant mortality rate and a higher percentage
of car ownership have higher spending as do cantons with more subsidies from the federal
level. These results are consistent with the fact that the demand for public services increases
with income. Several control variables ￿ ip sign once we include canton ￿xed e⁄ects: the
coe¢ cients on population and the size of the industrial sector, for example, are negative
13without ￿xed e⁄ects but positive with ￿xed e⁄ects.
The regressions highlight the importance of accounting for unobserved di⁄erences across
cantons. The coe¢ cient on the mandatory budget referendum, for instance, declines by more
than 60 percent if we include ￿xed e⁄ects (compare columns (2) and (3) of table 3). For both
institutions, our estimates are substantially smaller than those reported in cross-sectional
studies. Based on the ￿xed e⁄ects ￿ndings, we conclude that budget referendum and voter
initiative have a constraining e⁄ect on expenditures and revenues; but the results suggest
that this e⁄ect is more moderate than suggested by the previous literature.
4.2 Substitution to Local Governments and Decentralization?
The in￿ uence of direct democratic institutions need not be restricted to cantonal ￿nances.
Citizen control at the canton level could also a⁄ect spending behavior at the local level for at
least two reasons. Direct democracy might reduce local spending because citizens also prefer
less local government or because local revenues are constrained by canton resources. In that
case, canton and local spending are complements. Direct democracy could also increase local
spending: canton politicians, constrained by voter control, might try to delegate spending
to the local level. In that case, canton and local spending would be substitutes.
The previous literature ￿nds strong evidence that direct democracy at the state level
increases spending at the local level (Feld, Schaltegger and Schnellenbach, 2008; Matsusaka,
1995). Our descriptive statistics in table 2 also suggests that cantons with mandatory budget
referendum rely more on local spending.
We test how institutional constraints at the canton level a⁄ect spending at the local
level. Our dependent variable is now the (log of) per capita spending by local governments
in each canton. Table 4 shows the results. If we only include year e⁄ects (column (1)) and
14observable canton characteristics (column (2)), the mandatory budget referendum appears
to increase spending at the local level by 20.3 percent. And yet, the large shift to local
government could be spurious if cantons di⁄er in their preferences for government spending,
their preferences for local as opposed to canton spending or other political institutions that
govern the division between canton and local governments.
Once we include canton ￿xed e⁄ects, we ￿nd no e⁄ect of the budget referendum on local
spending (column (3)). Hence, observed di⁄erences in local expenditures between cantons
with and without mandatory budget referendum are driven by permanent di⁄erences across
cantons; they are not caused by the institution of the budget referendum per se.
Higher costs for the voter initiative have a positive e⁄ect on local spending: a one percent
higher signature requirement at the canton level results in 0.06 percent more local spending.
The positive relationship suggests that higher barriers for the voter initiative results in more
spending both at the canton and local level.
The results raise a related question: does direct democracy result in a more decentral-
ized government? We measure centralization of government spending as
Canton Exp
Canton+Local Exp:
If stronger direct democracy decentralizes public spending, the coe¢ cient on the budget
referendum should be negative and on the voter initiative positive. As before, we ￿nd no
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of the mandatory budget referendum on government central-
ization once we include ￿xed e⁄ects. For the voter initiative, higher signature requirements
actually reduce government centralization, contrary to our expectation (see column (6) of
table 4).
This section demonstrates again the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogene-
ity. The budget referendum constrains expenditures at the canton level where voters can
directly control spending. It does however has no e⁄ect on spending at lower levels of govern-
15ment or the degree of government centralization. Hence, the possibility of rejecting spending
projects at the canton level has no consequences for local spending: budget referendums do
neither appear to reduce resources for local governments; nor do they shift spending projects
or responsibilities to the local level.
The e⁄ects of the voter initiative are somewhat di⁄erent: low signature requirements and
hence, low barriers to launch an initiative reduce spending both at the canton and local level.
The voter initiative does, however, not decentralize spending to the local level. One possible
interpretation of this result is as follows: suppose, a successful initiative imposes a limit on
spending or public debt. Everything else equal, such a constraint on canton ￿nances would
also lower resources available for local governments.
In sum, we ￿nd that the correlation between direct democracy and decentralized govern-
ment is driven by omitted variables, such as di⁄erential preferences for spending at the local
level or other political institutions that govern the division of labor between canton and local
level. We conclude from this section that the role of direct democracy for the structure of
￿scal federalism is limited. We next examine the validity of our estimates.
4.3 Robustness Checks
Our ￿xed e⁄ects approach might not capture all unobservable di⁄erences across cantons.
First, migration, electoral reform or social change more broadly might shift the demand for
government over our study period. To address this concern, we construct several measures
of voter preferences.
Our main measure uses the voter support for more government as a proxy for the demand
for government. We calculate this variable from data on voting behavior in all federal
16propositions over our period.16 Between 1890 and 2000, citizens in all cantons voted on 452
federal ballots. We use the o¢ cial documents prepared by the government to select only
ballots that decided on public spending, taxes or other revenues. After careful study, we
identi￿ed 108 propositions with an unambiguous increase in expenditures, subsidies or taxes.
Table A1 provides a list of all votes and their outcome with predictable ￿scal consequences.
The table shows that our ballots span a broad range of political issues: from the introduction
of fuel taxes, government ￿nances and environmental protection to education and health
policy. We use the approval rate for more government spending in each canton as our
measure. To adjust for di⁄erences in approval rates across ballots, we subtract the mean
approval rate of each ballot. Negative numbers thus imply that a canton was less supportive
of higher spending than the average canton in that ballot.17
As an alternative preference measure, we use the strength of left-wing parties in canton
parliaments. Left-wing parties are often associated with more redistribution and a larger
government (for example, Tavares, 2004). Since representatives are elected by voters, we
expect that party a¢ liation re￿ ects voter preferences. The variable is calculated from the
number of seats of left-wing parties divided by the total number of parliamentary seats in
a canton. The measure has the advantage that is available for more years than our ballot
measure. It has the disadvantage that voters might elect left-wing parties for many reasons
unrelated to government spending.
Our ballot measure reveals that cantons with stronger direct democratic institutions
16Direct democracy plays an important role at the federal level as well. Citizens can initiate a partial or
total revision of the federal constitution, vote on changes to the federal constitution or international treaties;
if 50,000 signatures are collected, they can also request a referendum on each federal law.
17We experimented with alternative measures for approval rates. First, we use the raw approval rate
on a proposal instead its deviation from the mean. Second, we tried a more conservative strategy: we
included votes only if we could identify an increase in expenditures (rather than including increases in taxes
or subsidies). In both cases, the results were almost identical to the ones reported here.
17are much less supportive of government spending. Citizens in cantons with a mandatory
budget referendum are 1.6 percent less likely on average to approve federal propositions
that increase spending or taxes. In sharp contrast, the approval rate in cantons without a
mandatory budget referendum is 2.1 percent higher than the average canton. In contrast, we
￿nd no evidence that left-wing parties are necessarily weaker in cantons with stronger direct
democracy. Both measures exhibit substantial variation over time within the same canton.
Since voter preferences are correlated with direct democracy and ￿ uctuate over time, they
could be an important source of omitted variable bias.
The ￿rst two columns in table 5 report the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator when we add our
controls for government demand. The top panel shows the results for canton expenditures
and the bottom panel for local expenditures. All regressions include canton and year ￿xed
e⁄ects as well as the same controls as before. Voter preferences have little e⁄ect on the
coe¢ cients of the direct democratic institutions. Canton expenditures continue to be lower
in cantons with a mandatory budget referendum, while local expenditures are slightly lower
or una⁄ected. The voter initiative has a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect only if we include
left-wing parties. One reason could be the smaller sample if we use the ballot measure.
Alternatively, direct democracy might play a more important role in more heterogeneous
population. One reason is that politicians face more uncertainty about the preferences of
the electorate. If population heterogeneity also reduces spending, our results would again
overestimate the e⁄ect of direct democracy. Column (3) of table 5 adds measures of linguistic
and religious heterogeneity calculated as one minus the Her￿ndahl index of concentration.
Like our preference measures, population heterogeneity has little e⁄ect on the coe¢ cients.
Second, our period saw important changes in voting rights. In particular, women were en-
franchised and many cantons switched to proportional representation. Both electoral reforms
18should shift the position of the median voter and therefore the demand for government. Col-
umn (4) shows that our estimates remain unchanged if we include controls for these electoral
reforms.
Third, changes in other political institutions might be correlated with direct democracy
and spending. In some cantons, citizens decide on each law passed by the government in
a referendum. Column (5) includes a binary indicator equal to one if a canton has such
a mandatory law referendum in place and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cients on the budget
referendum become slightly more negative for canton and local expenditures; the coe¢ cients
on the voter initiative remain unchanged.
Similarly, more political decision-makers in parliament or executive could increase ex-
penditures, for example, because of log-rolling. Column (6) shows that the inclusion of size
of the executive and parliamentary seats does not a⁄ect our results. Several cantons also
have additional ￿scal restraints: balanced budgets are stipulated by many canton constitu-
tions; a number of cantons have also adopted de￿cit and debt limitations in the last two
decades. Fiscal constraints are overall more prevalent in cantons with stronger democracy
and might constrain spending. Column (7) therefore adds controls for balanced budget
rules and whether the canton has a constitutional or statutory limitations on de￿cits or
debt. Fiscal restraints do not have much e⁄ect on the coe¢ cients of our direct democratic
institutions.
Fourth, the standard errors of our ￿xed e⁄ects estimator might be downward biased if
spending is serially correlated. To address serial correlation, we implement the before-after
estimator suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) for a small number of policy changes. We ￿rst
regress expenditures on all our control variables and ￿xed e⁄ects. Then, we aggregate the
residuals in the period before and after the policy change for the subsample of cantons with
19changes in direct democratic institutions. The coe¢ cients in column (7) report the di⁄erence
of the residuals. The results at the canton level are even weaker and remain unchanged for
the local level.
Fifth, we checked whether alternative de￿nitions of the direct democratic variables change
our results (see table A2). Column (1) shows that the absolute number of signatures for the
voter initiative (rather than in percentage of the electorate) has a slightly weaker e⁄ect on
spending. We again ￿nd a positive e⁄ect if we use the log of the number of signatures instead
(not reported), which suggests that spending is more sensitive to changes at low levels of the
signatures requirement.
Column (2) relaxes the linear relationship between signature requirement and spending.
We added variables equal to one if a canton￿ s signature requirement is less than 1 percent,
between 1 and 3 percent and above 3 percent respectively, and zero otherwise. The omitted
category is cantons without a voter initiative in a given year. There are two noteworthy
results: ￿rst, a voter initiative reduces spending at the canton and local level relative to
a canton without the initiative. Second, higher signature requirements (above 3 percent)
reduce spending less than signature requirements under 1 percent. This result is noteworthy
because signature requirements are on average much lower than, for example, in the United
States.
Sixth, the budget referendum and voter initiative could be substitute means to control the
government (see Feld and Matsusaka, 2003). Column (3) con￿rms that the interaction e⁄ect
between the two is negative. Hence, a mandatory budget referendum is a more important
device to control spending when the costs of a voter initiative are high.
The e⁄ect of direct democracy could also have changed over our 110 years period. Voters
might not always prefer less spending than politicians. In fact, we do not ￿nd statistically
20signi￿cant di⁄erences in voter support for government spending using our ballot measure be-
tween cantons with and without mandatory budget referendum prior to 1945 (not reported).
Column (4) shows that the constraining e⁄ect of low signature requirements was much more
modest before 1945. This result con￿rms Matsusaka (1995) and Matsusaka (2000) who ￿nds
similar results for the United States. Similarly, the constraining e⁄ect of the mandatory
budget referendum is a recent phenomenon as well. Before 1945, there is no e⁄ect; after
1945, there is a statistically signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of 4.8 percent. Even if we focus on the
post-1945 period, the budget referendum has a constraining, but moderate e⁄ect on canton
spending; this is in line with our baseline results.
In sum, we ￿nd that the paper￿ s main ￿ndings are robust if address concerns of omitted
preferences, other institutional changes, biased standard errors or alternative speci￿cations
for the voter initiative.
5 Instrumental Variable Approach
5.1 Policy Endogeneity
A remaining concern with our empirical strategy is that reforms of direct democratic insti-
tutions are endogenous and hence correlated with the residual in equation (1). To assess this
concern, we test for spending trends prior to changes in direct democratic institutions. We
add dummy variables denoting intervals four to six and one to three years prior to institu-
tional reforms, and zero to four and more than ￿ve years after the reforms to the speci￿cation
in equation (1). The results in table A3 reveal strong spending trends prior to changes in
the mandatory budget referendum and voter initiative.
The result of prior trends is not surprising. After all, citizens would be more likely to
21demand more direct control over the budget after periods of severe overspending in the eye
of the voter. This reasoning suggests a reverse regression to test for feedback e⁄ects: can
spending shifts predict changes in direct democratic institutions?
Table A4 demonstrates that adopting the mandatory budget referendum is indeed pos-
itively correlated with expenditures two years before the reform (top panel, column (2)).
Similarly, a higher growth rate in spending increases the probability of adopting a manda-
tory budget referendum several years later (bottom panel). We ￿nd no evidence that past
spending levels or growth rates a⁄ect the decision to abolish the budget referendum or change
the signature requirement. Taken together, the evidence suggests that policy endogeneity is
a concern.
5.2 Constitutional Initiative and Direct Democracy
To eliminate the endogeneity bias, we use an instrumental variable approach. In Switzerland,
the rights of direct democratic participation through referendums and voter initiatives are
laid down in each canton￿ s constitution. A candidate instrument is how costly it is to revise
or amend the canton constitution. Hence, we propose as our instrument the constitutional
initiative which allows citizens to amend or demand a revision of the current constitution.
The instrument is in the spirit of Poterba (1996) who advocates the use of constitutional
rules to identify the causal e⁄ect of political institutions.
Swiss constitutional history provides many examples where the constitutional initiative
was used to expand democratic participation rights for its citizens (see Curti, 1900; K￿lz,
1992, 2004). It was a powerful tool to expand the in￿ uence of the political opposition and
other underrepresented groups. One example is the ￿Democratic Movement￿in the 1860s;
it initiated the adoption of the voter initiative and law referendum in Basle County in 1863.
22Several successful campaigns in other cantons followed.
In Grisons, the political opposition of young Democrats launched a constitutional initia-
tive to lower the signature requirement for the voter initiative. The constitutional initiative
to reduce the number from 5,000 to 3,000 signatures was approved by the electorate in 1891
(Metz, 1991). Similarly, a constitutional initiative in Scha⁄house in 1894 demanded the in-
troduction of the mandatory budget referendum. The draft of the new constitution included
the mandatory budget referendum for projects with extraordinary expenditures of 150,000
or recurrent expenditures of 15,000; it was approved by the electorate in 1895 (Schneider,
1993).18
The new constitution of the Swiss federation in 1848 mandated that all cantons adopt
the constitutional initiative. Cantons di⁄er however, in the number of signatures required
to launch such an initiative. High signature requirements impose signi￿cant barriers for
constitutional reform by the electorate. Hence, the constitutional initiative should have a
stronger e⁄ect if the signature requirement is low.
Additional support for this argument comes from an examination of the few cases where
direct democracy was examined without a constitutional initiative. In all four cantons, the
signature requirements for a constitutional revision were high: for example, Berne required
15,000 signatures and Fribourg 6,000 signatures already in 1900. As for the voter initiative,
we calculate the signature requirement for the constitutional initiative in percentage of the
eligible population. On average, 3.4 percent of the electorate is required to request a change
or amendment to the canton constitution.
The constitutional initiative shifts the costs of changing both the budget referendum and
18Other examples of the role of the constitutional initiative for the expansion of the voter initiative and
mandatory budget referendum after 1890 can be found in Lucerne, Sankt Gallen, Schwyz, Uri, Valais and
Zug (M￿ckli, 1987; K￿lz, 2004).
23the voter initiative. To separate the causal e⁄ect of the two institutions, we exploit the
long time horizon of our data. As an additional instrument, we use the provisions for the
mandatory budget referendum two decades earlier. Note that the ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cations
ensures that current direct democratic institutions are only a⁄ected by past changes in the
budget referendum; they are not a⁄ected by the presence of absence of a mandatory budget
referendum per se.
Table 6 shows the results of the ￿rst stage regressions. The dependent variable is whether
the canton has a budget referendum in place (column (1)) and the signature requirement
of the voter initiative (column (2)). As expected, a higher signature requirement to revise
the constitution is associated with a higher signature requirement for the voter initiative.
Changes in the provisions of the budget referendum in the past are positively correlated with
changes in current provisions for the budget referendum.
How strong are these e⁄ects? If we raised the costs of launching a constitutional initiative
by one standard deviation or 2.42 percent, the signature requirement for the voter initiative
would be 1.53 percent higher. The statistics at the bottom of the table show that we have
enough independent variation in the instruments. Shea￿ s partial R2 is 0.08 for the voter
initiative and 0.09 for the budget referendum. The F-statistics of the instruments also
suggest that our instruments are not weak (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
5.3 Instrumental Variable Results
The ￿rst stage shows a strong correlation between changes in direct democratic institutions
and our instruments. Can we also plausibly exclude the instruments from the spending
equation conditional on our control variables? The exclusion restriction would be invalid if
the constitutional initiative can be used to directly in￿ uence spending or revenue decisions.
24An examination of each canton￿ s constitutions, however, reveals this is not the case. The
constitutional initiative cannot be used to set spending levels, spending growth or limit
public debt at the canton level directly.19
Such a restriction would also be invalid if other political institutions are correlated both
with spending and the constitutional initiative. For example, the constitutional initiative
might be used to change the number of political decision-makers or voting rights. Both are
likely to a⁄ect spending because of log-rolling or changes in the median voter. To account
for these in￿ uences, we include in our speci￿cation controls for institutional changes over our
sample period: the number of decision-makers in the executive (cabinet size) and legislative
and the provision for the mandatory law referendum. We also include changes in voting
rights: the enfranchisement of women and the adoption of proportional representation for
the legislature. Finally, we add whether a balanced budget is required by the constitution.
Note also that all other permanent di⁄erences between cantons are absorbed by the canton
￿xed e⁄ects. Conditional on these institutions, canton characteristics and ￿xed e⁄ects, the
barrier for a constitutional initiative and past changes in the budget referendum appear to
be plausible instruments.
The second-stage results are shown on the right-hand side of table 6. We ￿rst report
the least squares results for canton (column (3)) and local expenditures (column (6)) as a
benchmark. Both are very similar to the results reported in table 3 and 4. We expect the
instrumental variable estimates to be larger in magnitude than least squares; the reason
is that higher spending in the past increases the likelihood of stricter direct democratic
19Since 2000, three cantons have amended their constitutions to incorporate debt and de￿cit limitations;
these prescribe rules and sanctions if canton de￿cits exceeds a prescribed threshold. Note that these di⁄er
from constitutional balanced budget rules which do not specify a speci￿c procedure or sanctions if de￿cits
occur. However, explicit rules to restrict de￿cits and hence indirectly a⁄ect spending decisions did not exist
in our study period from 1890 to 2000.
25institutions. Our ￿rst set of instrumental variable estimates is shown in columns (4) and (7).
The second set of estimates (columns (5) and (8)) also includes interaction e⁄ects between
the signature requirements and year dummies as additional instruments. This speci￿cation
allows for greater ￿ exibility in how the instrument a⁄ects direct democracy. In particular,
the constitutional initiative can be used to adopt a mandatory budget referendum in one
year and abolish it at a later point (or vice versa).
The instrumental variable estimates indicate that canton spending is 9 percent lower if
a budget referendum is mandatory. For the voter initiative, a one percent higher signature
requirement increases spending by 2.2 percent. Using a novel instrument to account for
policy endogeneity, we still ￿nd that the impact of direct democracy on canton spending is
moderate. For local expenditures, we ￿nd a negative for both the budget referendum and
the voter initiative; the coe¢ cient for the budget referendum is, however, barely signi￿cant.
Hence, the instrumental variables con￿rm that direct voter control at the canton level does
not shift spending to lower levels of governments.
As expected, the instrumental variable estimates are larger in magnitude than least
squares. Are the estimates also plausible given that they are much larger than the OLS
results? We believe the results are reasonable for three reasons. First, it is not uncommon in
the literature on endogenous institutions to ￿nd that instrumental variables are several times
larger than least squares (for example, Levitt, 1997; Levitt, 2002). Second, our estimated
e⁄ects of direct democratic institutions on canton spending are less than half the estimates
in comparable studies (Feld and Matsusaka, 2003). Finally, large estimates might be an
indication that the instruments should be included as controls in the second stage. However,
the overidenti￿cation test reported at the bottom of table does not speak to this concern:
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our instruments can be excluded from the second
26stage.
6 Conclusion
This article presents new evidence on the causal e⁄ect of direct democracy on public spend-
ing. We ￿nd that both mandatory budget referendum and voter initiative reduce canton
spending. The constraining e⁄ects of both institutions are however moderate especially if
compared to the previous, cross-sectional literature. Our ￿ndings highlight the importance of
accounting for unobservable di⁄erences across cantons and to address the bias from potential
endogeneity and omitted variables.
We also show that direct democratic institutions at the canton level play a limited role for
the vertical structure of government. Mandatory budget referendums do not shift spending
to the local level; if anything, they tend to reduce spending at the local level. We also ￿nd
no strong e⁄ect of the voter initiative on local spending. And neither the budget referendum
nor the voter initiative decentralizes spending to the local level. These results are novel and
contradict previous evidence based on cross-sectional variation.
Both voter initiative and budget referendum reduce government spending at the canton
level but have only a limited impact on lower levels of government. While the costs of
launching an initiative are higher, it also gives citizens more leverage how to control the
spending decisions of their governments. It would be interesting to compare the initiative
and referendum along other dimensions; for example, how much politicians are bound by
referendums and initiatives or how much information about preferences they provide for
politicians.
Finally, we would like to point out that our results do not imply that direct democracy
27improves welfare. To do so, we would need to compare the desired spending levels of the
median voter with the costs of direct democratic participation to voters. While such an
analysis is feasible in principle, we leave an exploration of these welfare e⁄ects for future
research.
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A Data Appendix
The appendix describes the data sources and construction of variables. Our outcome vari-
ables are canton expenditures, revenues and local expenditures. All expenditure and revenue
categories are expressed per capita and de￿ ated to 2000 Swiss Francs using the annual con-
sumer price index reported in Schuppli and Studer (2004). Canton expenditures and revenues
are taken from the annual publication Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz for the years 1890
to 1950 and from ￿⁄entliche Finanzen der Schweiz for 1950 to 2000. Government expen-
ditures and revenues are interpolated for two years with missing observations (1967 and
1968). Local expenditures are taken from Historical Statistics of Switzerland and available
for 1863, 1900, 1910, 1938 and annually since 1950. Data are missing in Nidwalden, Uri and
Scha⁄house for 1863, 1900 and 1910 as well as in Obwalden, Solothurn, Appenzell-Innerrhode
and Appenzell-Outerrhode in 1900 and 1910. Data for all cantons are missing in 1967 and
1968. Federal subsidies are revenues for cantons comprised of subsidies by the federal state
31for roads, education, welfare, agriculture and other areas. This control variable is obtained
from Historical Statistics of Switzerland prior to 1955 and ￿⁄entliche Finanzen der Schweiz
thereafter. The data are available for 1893, annually between 1915 and 1926, 1928, 1930,
1931, 1933, 1935-1937, 1940, 1942, 1943, 1945, 1946, 1949 and annually since 1953, but
missing between 1968 and 1977. Missing years were obtained by linear interpolation.
Our main institutional variable is the mandatory budget referendum and the signature
requirement for the voter initiative. We gathered this information from each canton￿ s past
and current constitutions (available at http://www.verfassungen.de/ch) and relevant canton
laws. We employed published sources to validate and cross-check our coding of the institu-
tional variables (K￿lz, 2004; Monnier, 1996; Ritzmann-Blickernstorfer, 1996; Trechsel and
Serd￿lt, 1999; Vatter, 2002). If in doubt, we contacted the cantonal Public Record O¢ ces
(Staatsarchive) to clarify any inconsistencies. Our ￿rst measure is a binary indicator equal
to one if the canton had a mandatory budget referendum in that year. The indicator is
zero if the canton had an optional or no budget referendum. For the voter initiative, we use
the signature requirement for launching an initiative measured in percentage of the eligible
population. We assigned a signature requirement of 30 percent if the voter initiative was not
adopted in that year. Three cantons adopted the voter initiative shortly after 1890: Geneva
in 1891, Ticino in 1892 and Berne in 1893. The remaining three cantons adopted it in 1906
(Lucerne), 1907 (Valais) and 1921 (Fribourg). Estimates are not sensitive to alternative
speci￿cations of the 30 percent threshold. We examine the in￿ uence of the mandatory law
referendum that requires all canton laws to be approved by the electorate. The variable is a
binary indicator if a canton has a mandatory law referendum in place and zero otherwise. We
also construct two measures of ￿scal constraints: ￿rst, a binary indicator equal to one if the
canton has a balanced budget rule in their constitution in a given year and zero otherwise.
Second, a binary indicator equal to one if the canton has constitutional or statutory de￿cit
or debt limitations in place in a year and zero otherwise. Both were coded from the canton
constitutions and Stau⁄er (2001).
Information on voter support for more spending is collected from the online database of all
federal propositions by the Federal Statistical O¢ ce (http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/).
We calculate our measure of voter preferences as the percentage of votes for propositions that
would increase spending if approved. To identify votes with ￿scal consequences, we use the of-
￿cial documents by the federal government (http://www.ads.bar.admin.ch/ADS/showHome.do).
They contain the arguments for and against each proposition as well as its estimated ￿nan-
cial consequences, i.e. whether and by how much expenditures or taxes would increase if the
proposition was approved. Our second preference measure is calculated from the number of
seats held by left-wing parties divided by the number of seats in the canton parliament. Both
are compiled from Ho⁄erbert (1967), the Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz, all past and cur-
32rent constitutions and information provided by each canton￿ s Public Record O¢ ce. Left-wing
party seats are missing for two cantons (Appenzell-Innerrhode and Appenzell-Outerrhode).
No party seat information is available for Nidwalden prior to 1943 and Obwalden prior to
1966. Party a¢ liations were often not well-de￿ned in the late 19th and early 20th century.
For seven cantons (Basle City, Geneva, Neuchatel, Lucerne, Solothurn, Schwyz and Zug), we
have party a¢ liation over the whole period; for seven more (Aargau, Saint Gallen, Zurich,
Basle County, Fribourg, Thurgau and Grisons) we have information since the 1910s. Infor-
mation in four cantons (Berne, Glarus, Ticino and Valais) is available since the 1920s and
for the remaining three since the early 1930s.
Our control variables are taken from the decennial Census as reported in Historical Sta-
tistics of Switzerland, Ho⁄erbert (1976) and Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz; the data are
available for 1888, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1941, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. The
population in each canton is from Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz and available annually
since 1888. Population density is measured as the log of a canton￿ s population. Urban popu-
lation is calculated as the share living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants. The data
is taken from Historical Statistics of Switzerland and Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz and
available for 1890, 1894, 1898, 1903, for each decade between 1910 and 1960 as well as 1962,
1969, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1990 and 2000. The information on the population in the various age
groups (below 20, between 20 and 64 and above 65), the number of foreigners and religious
a¢ liation is from the decennial Census. All three variables are expressed as percentage of
the total population. Religious a¢ liation is calculated as the share of the population that
is Protestant as opposed to being Catholic or another religion. We collected several labor
market indicators to control for di⁄erences in economic activity across cantons. Total em-
ployment and employment shares in agriculture and manufacturing are from the decennial
Census. The labor force participation rate is then calculated by dividing the number of
people employed by the canton￿ s total population.
We use three additional variables to control for income di⁄erences across cantons. The
number of doctors is calculated per 1,000 inhabitants. The data is from Historical Statistics
of Switzerland, Ho⁄erbert (1976) and Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz and available for
1890, 1895, 1900, 1910, 1917, 1920, 1926, 1930, 1935, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965,
1970, 1975. 1980. 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. Infant mortality denotes the number of
children that died before reaching age one and is expressed per 100,000 births. The data
for births and infant mortality is available annually since 1890 and taken from Historical
Statistics of Switzerland. Car ownership is calculated as number of cars per population and
is from Historical Statistics of Switzerland and Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz. It is zero
before the ￿rst cars emerged in 1910 and positive thereafter. Data on cars owned is available
for 1910, 1914, 1917, 1923, 1929, 1934, 1939, 1945, 1947, 1950, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1966, 1970,
331975, 1978, 1982, 1986 and annually since 1990. We used linear interpolation for missing
years between two data points; data before 1910 are set to zero.
34Mandatory Changes in  Signature  Changes in 
Budget Mandatory Requirement  Signature  Requirement
Referendum Budget Referendum Voter Initiative of Voter Initiative
Aargau (AG) No Abolish (1982) 3,000 Decrease (1982)
Appenzell Outerrhode (AR) Yes No 300 Increase (1995)
Appenzell Innerrhode (AI) Yes Adopt (1979) 1 No
Basle County (BL) No Adopt (1892), Abolish (1945) 1,500 No
Basle City (BS) No No 4,000 Increase (1950; 1975)
Berne (BE) No Adopt (1893), Abolish (1995) 15,000 Increase (1995)
Fribourg (FR) Yes Adopt (1972) 6,000 No
Geneva (GE) No Adopt (1927), Abolish (1931) 10,000 Increase (1936, 1950)
Glarus (GL) Yes No 1 No
Grisons (GR) Yes No 3,000 Decrease (1893)
Lucerne (LU) Yes Adopt (1969) 4,000 No
Neuchatel (NE) Yes Adopt (1949), Abolish (2000) 6,000 Increase (1959)
Nidwalden (NW) Yes Adopt (1913) 250 Increase (1996)
Obwalden (OW) No Adopt (1902), Abolish (1998) 500 Increase (1998)
Schaffhouse (SH) Yes Adopt (1895) 1,000 No
Schwyz (SZ) Yes No 2,000 No
Solothum (SO) Yes No 3,000 Increase (1977)
St. Gallen (SG) Yes Adopt (1929) 4,000 No
Ticino (TI) No No 7,000 Increase (1970)
Thurgau (TG) Yes No 4,000 Increase (1990)
Uri (UR) Yes No 600 Increase (1929, 1955, 1997)
Vaud (VD) No Abolish (1948), Adopt (1998) 12,000 Increase (1961)
Valais (VS) No Abolish (1994) 4,000 Increase (1973), Decrease (1994)
Zurich (ZH) No Abolish (1999) 10,000 Increase (1979)
Zug (ZG) No No 2,000 Decrease (1894), Increase (1991)
Table 1: Direct Democratic Instruments in Swiss Cantons in 2000
Notes: The table summarizes the key features of direct democracy in Swiss cantons. Column (1) reports whether cantons have a mandatory budget
referendum in 2000, while column (2) shows whether and when cantons changed their provisions for the budget referendum between 1890 and 2000.
The budget referendum in Fribourg after 1972 and Valais between 1920 and 1994 applies to extraordinary expenditures only which we code as a
mandatory referendum. Obwalden only had a referendum for spending on roads prior to 1902 which we do code as no mandatory budget referendum.
Column (3) shows the absolute number of signatures required to launch a voter initiative, which is available in all cantons in 2000. Finally, column (4)
shows the changes in the absolute number of signatures required over our sample period. In the empirical analysis, our measure of the voter initiative is
the signature requirement in percentage of the eligible population. T Statistic
Mean Std.  Dev Mean Std.  Dev Difference
Fiscal Policy
Expenditures per capita (log) 7.15 1.24 7.18 1.31 0.5
Revenues per capita (log) 7.13 1.25 7.15 1.31 0.4
Local expenditures in canton (log) 7.07 1.19 6.63 1.13 -9.5
Degree of Centralization  53.72 12.45 61.38 17.15 -2.9
Political Institutions
Signature requirement initiative (%) 2.13 1.68 2.72 1.83 8.4
Mandatory law referendum 0.84 0.37 0.26 0.44 -40.4
Size of Parliament 115.67 55.74 111.42 43.19 -2.0
Size of Executive 6.44 1.44 6.75 1.32 5.7
Proportional Representation 0.53 0.50 0.76 0.43 11.7
Women Suffrage Adopted? 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 -1.5
Balanced Budget Rule  0.03 0.18 0.04 0.21 1.6
Deficit or Debt Limitations 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.11 -6.3
Control Variables
Language: non-German 0.14 0.35 0.43 0.49 17.9
Age 0 to 19 (%) 34.22 6.11 32.99 7.83 -4.6
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Institutional Regime
Mandatory Referendum No Mandatory Referendum
Age 0 to 19 (%) 34.22 6.11 32.99 7.83 4.6
Age 20 to 39 (%) 29.66 2.25 30.58 2.94 9.3
Age 40 to 64 (%) 26.50 3.07 27.33 4.04 6.1
Age 65 and Above (%)  9.63 3.47 9.10 3.70 -3.7
Log population 11.61 1.13 11.69 1.06 1.7
Urban population (%) 19.01 19.07 37.77 31.02 19.7
Federal subsidies (log) 5.43 1.21 5.16 1.07 -5.7
Employment in primary sector (%) 21.04 12.91 18.89 15.44 -3.9
Employment in secondary sector (%) 44.66 11.96 41.54 9.81 -7.0
Labor force participation 39.92 7.15 42.13 8.36 6.9
Doctors per 1,000 inhabitants 0.81 0.35 1.05 0.64 12.6
Car ownership (%) 12.58 16.50 11.70 17.01 -1.3
Infant mortality rate  59.77 106.05 61.20 89.29 0.4
Linguistic Heterogeneity 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.16 1.9
Religious Heterogeneity 0.34 0.20 0.34 0.20 -0.3
Notes: The table reports summary statistics over the whole sample period (1890-2000) separately for cantons with mandatory budget
referendum and those without. The last column reports the T-value for differences in means between the two groups of cantons. The
degree of centralization is the percentage of local and canton expenditures that are undertaken at the canton level. The signature
requirement for the voter initiative is calculated as percentage of the population over 20. Linguistic and religious heterogeneity is
calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index for three language and religious groups. Infant mortality is calculated as number of
children dying before age 1 among 100,000 births.     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Budget Referendum  -0.267 -0.093 -0.034 -0.259 -0.086 -0.018
(0.017)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)** (0.017)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)
Signature Requirement Initiative -0.01 0.004 0.005 -0.011 0.005 0.006
(0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Log Population  -0.122 0.122 -0.128 0.135
(0.008)*** (0.050)** (0.008)*** (0.054)**
% Age 20 to 39 Years  0.056 -0.005 0.048 -0.016
(0.005)*** (0.004) (0.005)*** (0.004)***
% Age 40 to 64 Years  0.039 0.002 0.035 -0.002
(0.004)*** (0.003) (0.004)*** (0.004)
% Above Age 65  0.006 -0.04 0.008 -0.033
(0.005) (0.006)*** (0.005) (0.007)***
% Urban Population 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Federal Subsidies (log) 0.138 0.146 0.117 0.128
(0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.010)***
% Employed Agriculture -0.014 0.004 -0.018 -0.001
(0.002)*** (0.002)* (0.002)*** (0.002)
% Employed Industry  -0.006 0.016 -0.007 0.015
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)***
Labor Force Participation (%) -0.01 -0.018 -0.011 -0.018
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Doctors (per 1,000 inhabitants) 0.089 -0.164 0.057 -0.215
(0.029)*** (0.027)*** (0.030)* (0.029)***
Car Ownership (%) 0.023 0.013 0.023 0.012
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)***
Infant Mortality Rate -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Structure of Canton  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2524 2524 2524 2524 2524 2524
R-squared 0.90 0.96 0.98 0.90 0.95 0.98
Joint Significance Canton FE 110.4 98.1
(p value) <0.001 <0.001
Table 3: Direct Democracy and Fiscal Policy: Fixed Effects 
Canton Expenditures Canton Revenues
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is log annual canton per capita expenditures and log annual canton per capita revenues in
columns (4)-(6). The first specification (columns (1) and (4)) include only whether a canton has a mandatory budget referendum in place and the
signature requirement for the voter initiative as well as year dummies. The second specification adds log population, the percentage of the
population in different age groups (20-39, 40-64, 65 and over with age 0-19 as the omitted category), the percentage of the population living in
cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, the percentage of workers employed in agriculture and industry, the log per capita federal subsidies to a
canton, labor force participation rate, infant mortality rate, the per capita ownership of cars and the number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. The last two rows in columns (3) and (6) report the F-
statistic and p-value for the joint significance of the canton fixed effects.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Budget Referendum  0.219 0.203 -0.024 -8.96 -6.302 -0.372
(0.025)*** (0.024)*** (0.024) (0.578)*** (0.552)*** (0.517)
Signature Requirement Initiative 0.002 0.019 0.017 -0.274 -0.366 -0.333
(0.003) (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.067)*** (0.074)*** (0.055)***
Log Population  0.139 -0.911 -4.882 14.947
(0.014)*** (0.090)*** (0.330)*** (1.912)***
% Urban Population -0.003 0.006 0.032 -0.069
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.018)* (0.026)***
Federal Subsidies (log) 0.016 -0.062 3.389 4.388
(0.021) (0.018)*** (0.482)*** (0.383)***
% Employed Agriculture -0.023 -0.019 0.017 0.289
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.069) (0.072)***
% Employed Industry  -0.002 0.011 -0.287 -0.152
(0.002) (0.004)*** (0.055)*** (0.076)**
Labor Force Participation (%) 0.009 -0.001 -0.296 -0.250
(0.002)*** (0.002) (0.054)*** (0.050)***
Doctors (per 1,000 inhabitants) -0.531 -0.416 5.325 -2.531
(0.051)*** (0.047)*** (1.173)*** (0.984)**
Car Ownership (%) 0.048 0.043 -1.057 -0.962
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.102)*** (0.085)***
Infant Mortality Rate -0.0003 -0.0002 0.042 0.030
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.004)*** (0.003)***
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Structure of Canton  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2410 2410 2410 2410 2410 2410
R-squared 0.77 0.84 0.93 0.16 0.44 0.79
Joint Significance Canton FE 117.1 152.8
(p value) <0.001 <0.001
Notes: The dependent variable in the first three columns is log per capita expenditures of local communities in each canton; in columns
(4) to (6), it is the percentage of per capita expenditures at the canton level calculated as canton spending/(canton+local spending). For
three cantons (Uri, Schaffhouse and Nidwalden), local expenditures were only available since 1938. See the notes to Table 3 for an
explanation of the independent variables included in the estimation. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. The last two rows in columns (3) and (6) report the F-statistic and p-value for the joint significance of the canton
fixed effects.
Table 4: Direct Democracy and Decentralization: Fixed Effects
Local Expenditures Centralization MeasureVoter  Voter  Population Change in  Mandatory  Size of  Fiscal  Account for
Preferences Preferences Heterogeneity Voting  Law  Parliament, Restraints Serial
(ballot support) (left parties) Rights Referendum Executive Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Y: Canton Expenditures
Budget Referendum -0.045 -0.042 -0.04 -0.034 -0.049 -0.025 -0.033 -0.017
(0.015)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)*** (0.014)* (0.012)*** (0.009)*
Signature Requirement Initiative 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.002)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*
Voter Preferences 0.003 0
(0.001)** (0.001)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1349 2399 2524 2524 2524 2524 2524 1514
R Squared  0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Y: Local Expenditures
Budget Referendum -0.043 -0.051 -0.024 -0.024 -0.036 0.011 -0.005 -0.016
(0.031) (0.017)** (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016)
Signature Requirement Initiative 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.017 0.009
(0.013) (0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)***
Voter Preferences 0.004 0.377
(0.002)* (0.116)**
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1322 1904 2410 2410 2410 2410 2410 1438
R Squared  0.94 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93
Notes: The dependent variable in the top panel is the log of canton expenditures and the log of local expenditures in the bottom panel. Column (1) and (2) adds our preference measures (voter support
for more government and the share of left-wing parties in canton parliaments respectively) to the baseline. Column (3) includes two measures of religious and linguistic heterogeneity. Column (4)
controls for the introduction of female suffrage and proportional represention. Column (5) also controls for the mandatory law referendum, while column (6) adds the size of executive and the size of
parliament. Column (7) controls for fiscal restraints: balanced budget rules in the constitution and statutory or constitutional limits on deficits and debts. Finally, column (8) implements the before-after
estimator proposed by Betrand et al. (2004) to deal with serial correlation in the case of a small number of states. All specifications include year and canton fixed effects and the same controls as in
column (3) in Table 3. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p< 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 5: Robustness ChecksBudget Voter  OLS  IV IV plus OLS  IV IV plus
Referendum Initiative Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mandatory Budget Referendum  -0.049 -0.123 -0.09 0.025 -0.091 -0.091
(0.011)*** (0.058)*** (0.031)*** (0.016) (0.055)* (0.047)*
Signature Requirement Initiative 0.009 0.009 0.022 0.02 0.011 -0.018
(0.002)*** (0.009) (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.011) (0.010)*
Signature Requirement Constitutional Initiative 0.002 0.633
(0.010) (0.044)***
Budget Referendum 20 Years Earlier 0.364 0.564
(0.035)*** (0.161)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2191 2191 2191
R Squared 0.74 0.65 0.98 0.96
Shea's Partial R Squared of First-Stage 0.09 0.08
F-Statistic Excluded Instruments  53.34 114.16
Sargan statistic  66.5 72.9
(p value) 0.97 0.91
Table 6: Direct Democracy and Fiscal Policy: Instrumental Variables 
Notes: The table reports instrumental variable results. The instruments for the budget referendum and signature requirement of the voter initiative are the signature requirement to launch a constitutional
initiative and the provisions for the budget referendum 20 years earlier. Columns (1) and (2) show the first stage where the dependent variable is whether a canton has a mandatory budget referendum
(column (1)) or the signature requirement for the voter initiative (column (2)). The dependent variable in columns (3) to (5) are log canton expenditures and log local expenditures in columns (6) to (8).
Columns (3) and (6) show the least squares regression results for the sample with valid observations of the instruments. Columns (4) and (7) show the second-stage instrumental variable estimates.
Columns (5) and (8) show the second-stage instrumental variables results where the effects of the constitutional initiative varies by year. All specifications include year and canton fixed effects, the same
controls as in previous tables and the following additional controls: whether the canton has a mandatory law referendum, the number of seats in the canton parliament, the size of the executive, whether a
canton had women's suffrage adopted, proportional representation and constitutional fiscal restraints. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
Second Stage (Local Expenditures) First Stage Results  Second Stage (Canton Expenditures)Figure 1: Map of Swiss Cantons
Legend: 
White: No Mandatory Budget Referendum, High Signature Requirement Initiative
Yellow: No Mandatory Budget Referendum, Low Signature Requirement Initiative
Orange: Mandatory Budget Referendum, High Signature Requirement Initiative
Red: Mandatory Budget Referendum, Low Signature Requirement Initiative Number Title of Proposition Year  % Yes Outcome Number Title of Proposition Year  % Yes Outcome
35 Disability Insurance for Civil Servants and Public Employees 1891 21% No 302 Removal of Canton Share in Stamp Duties 1980 67% Yes
43 Share Customs Revenues with Cantons [lessexp]  1894 29% No 303 Redistribution of Revenues from Alcohol Tax 1980 71% Yes
46 Revision of Military Provisions 1895 42% No 305 For a new Immigration Policy 1981 16% No
52 Trade with Food (Revise Article 24, Constitution) 1897 65% Yes 308 Improving Federal Finances 1981 69% Yes
53 Nationalisation of Swiss Railways 1898 68% Yes 312 Regulation of Gas Taxes 1983 53% Yes
56 Health and Accident Insurance 1900 30% No 313 Energy Article 1983 49% No
60 Revision of Tariffs on Foreign Products [lessexp] 1903 60% Yes 316 Introduction of User Fee for Heavy Traffic 1984 59% Yes
66 Change in Organization of Swiss Military 1907 55% Yes 317 User Fee for Highways (Nationalstrassen) 1984 53% Yes
71 Health and Accident Insurance 1912 54% Yes 323 Protection Motherhood 1984 15% No
99 Initiative for Old Age, Widow and Disability Insurance  1925 42% Yes 324 Regulation of Radio and Television 1984 69% Yes
101 Federal Law on Old Age, Widow and Disability Insurance 1925 65% Yes 331 Removal of Canton Share in Stamp Duties 1985 67% Yes
102 Constitutional Amendment Regarding Corn Supply  1926 50% No 332 Redistribution of Revenues from Alcohol Tax 1985 72% Yes
115 Old Age and Widow Insurance 1931 40% No 335 Subsidies for Small and Medium-Sized Firms 1985 43% No
117 Temporary Decrease in Salaries of Public Employees 1933 45% No 339 Culture Initiative 1986 43% No
119 Change in Organization of Military Training 1935 54% Yes 340 Secure Vocational Training and Retraining 1986 17% No
121 Fight Economic Crisis 1935 43% No 341 Domestic Sugar Industry Regulation 1986 38% No
131 Loans for Military Investment and Reduce Unemployment 1939 69% Yes 342 Protection of Renters 1986 63% Yes
132 Change in Insurance for Civil Servants 1939 44% No 348 Railway 2000 1987 56% Yes
139 Protecting the Family 1945 76% Yes 349 Protection of the Moor 1987 57% Yes
141 Establishing a Right of Holding a Job 1946 19% No 350 Reform Health Insurance 1987 28% No
142 Economic Reforms and Right of Holding a Job 1947 31% No 351 Constitutional Basis for Transport Policy 1988 46% No
143 Revision of Economic Laws in the Constitution 1947 53% Yes 352 Decrease Retirement Age  1988 35% No
145 Regulation of Swiss Sugar Industry  1948 36% No 363 Regulation of Wine Industry 1990 46% No
150 Subsidies for Housing Construction  1950 46% No 367 Energy Supply Article 1990 71% Yes
157 Contribution to Costs of National Defense 1951 33% No 368 Change in Traffic Law  1990 52% Yes
159 Subsidies for Agriculture 1952 64% Yes 370 Promoting Public Transport 1991 37% No
168 Changes in Federal Finances 1953 42% No 371 Reform of Federal Finances 1991 46% No
171 Subsidies for Swiss War Veterans Living Abroad 1954 44% No 373 Financing of Health Insurance 1992 39% No
177 Subsidy for Canton Grisons 1956 43% No 377 Protection of Waters 1992 66% Yes
178 Changes in Order for Wheat Production 1956 39% No 381 Saving the Waters 1992 37% No
187 Improving the Road Infrastructure 1958 85% Yes 382 Building Railway through the Alps 1992 63% Yes
194 Subsidies for Milk Producers  1960 56% Yes 386 Raise Salary of Parliamentary Members 1992 27% No
196 Gas Tax for Financing Highway Construction (Nationalstrassen 1961 47% No 387 Improve Infrastructure for Parliamentary Members 1992 30% No
201 Salaries of Representatives and Government Members 1962 32% No 389 Increase in Gas Tax 1993 55% Yes
205 Scholarships and Other Training Subsidies 1963 79% Yes 398 Unemployment Insurance 1993 70% Yes
207 Vocational Training 1964 67% Yes 399 Federal Finances  1993 67% Yes
219 Subsidies for Domestic Sugar Industry 1970 54% Yes 400 Improving Federal Finances 1993 58% Yes
222 Housing Guarantee and Protection of Families 1970 49% No 401 Maintenance of Social Security 1993 63% Yes
223 Changes in Federal Finances 1970 55% No 405 Continuing Highway Fee 1994 69% Yes
227 Subsidies for Apartment Construction 1972 30% No 406 Continuing Heavy Traffic Fee 1994 72% Yes
232 Changes in Old Age and Disability Insurance 1972 16% No 407 Introduction of User Fee for Heavy Traffic 1994 67% Yes
235 Subsidies for Scientific Research  1973 65% Yes 410 Promote Culture 1994 50% No
240 Restriction on Deductions of Income Tax  1973 68% Yes 415 Change in Health Insurance 1994 51% Yes
245 Socially Acceptable Health Insurance 1974 27% No 416 For a new Health Insurance 1994 23% No
248 Financing Highway Construction (Nationalstrassen) 1975 54% Yes 423 Securing Invalidity/Age Insurance 1995 27% No
249 Changes in General Customs Tariffs 1975 48% No 430 For an Environmentally Oriented Agriculture 1996 77% Yes
258 Loan to International Development Agency 1976 44% No 431 Re-Organisation Administration 1996 39% No
268 Changes in Sales Tax and Direct Federal Tax 1977 41% No 442 Introduction of User Fee for Heavy Traffic 1998 57% Yes
281 Decrease Retirement Age  1978 21% No 444 Reform of Age Insurance 1998 41% No
286 Subsidies for Universities/Technical Colleges 1978 43% No 445 Infrastructure for Public Transportation 1998 63% Yes
289 Milk Production 1978 69% Yes 458 Law on Insurance of Motherhood 1999 38% No
291 Federal Responsibility for Security  1978 44% No 465 Subsidies for Solar Energy (Solarrappen) 2000 31% No
294 Subsidize Hiking Trails 1979 76% Yes 469 For a flexible Age Insurance 2000 39% No
297 Changes in Sales Tax and Direct Federal Tax 1979 35% No 470 For a flexible Retirement Age 2000 46% No
Notes: The table lists the federal propositions, which would have increased the size of government through higher spending, taxes or subsidies. The financial consequences of a proposition were assessed using the official documents by the federal government
(available at http://www.ads.bar.admin.ch/ADS/showHome.do), which are distributed to each citizen before the vote. The first column shows the official number of the vote. Column (4) contains the percentage of voters supporting the proposition, while the last column
reports the final outcome. For vote #223, the majority of the electorate voted in favor but the Council of States rejected it. 
Table A1: Federal Propositions inducing More Federal Spending, 1891-2000Absolute # Discrete  Interaction Effect by
of Signatures Signature  Budget Ref. Subperiods
Law Initiative Requirement Law Initiative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Y: Canton Expenditures
Budget Referendum -0.034 -0.036 0.012 -0.048
(0.014)** (0.014)*** (0.016) (0.017)***
Signature Requirement Initiative (%) 0.008 0.022
(0.002)*** (0.005)***
# Signatures Required Initiative/100 0.001
(0.0004)***
Signature Requirement 1% or less -0.324
(0.043)***
Signature Requirement 1 to 3% -0.175
(0.039)***
Signature Requirement More than 3% -0.099
(0.035)***
Interaction Effect BRef*Initiative -0.016
(0.003)***
Budget Referendum before 1945 0.014
(0.019)
Signature Requirement before 1945 -0.017
(0.005)***
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2524 2524 2524 2524
R Squared  0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Y: Local Expenditures
Budget Referendum -0.058 -0.026 0.183 -0.026
(0.027)** (0.024) (0.028)*** (0.029)
Signature Requirement Initiative 0.030 0.011
(0.003)*** (0.010)
# Signatures Required Initiative/100 0.0003
(0.0007)
Signature Requirement 1 % or less -0.363
(0.079)***
Signature Requirement 1 to 3 % -0.412
(0.071)***
Signature Requirement More than 3 % -0.445
(0.064)***
Interaction Effect BRef*Initiative -0.069
(0.005)***
Budget Referendum before 1945 0.008
(0.035)
Signature Requirement before 1945 0.006
(0.009)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2490 2410 2410 2410
R Squared  0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Table A2: Additional Results 
Notes: The table reports results for log canton expenditures (top panel) and log local expenditures (bottom panel). Column (1)
uses a discrete measure for the signature requirement with the omitted group of no voter initiative. Column (2) uses the
absolute number of signatures for the law initiative (divided by 1000). Column (3) includes the interaction between mandatory
budget referendum and the signature requirement for the law initiative. Column (4) allows the coefficients for the direct
democratic institutions to vary before and after the end of World War II in 1945. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.    4-6 Years 1-3 Years 0-4 Years  More than 5 Years p value p value
log Canton Expenditures before Change before Change after Change after Change 4-6 vs 1-3 yrs. 0-4 vs 5+ yrs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7)
Adopt Budget Referendum -0.064 0.081 0.049 0.005 0.00 0.01
(0.023)*** (0.028)*** (0.025)* (0.017)
Abolish Budget Referendum 0.001 0.04 0.076 0.167 0.20 0.01
(0.015) (0.020)** (0.025)*** (0.026)***
Change Signatures Law Initiative 0.03 -0.008 0.035 0.271 0.25 0.00
(0.016)* (0.020) (0.016)** (0.030)***
Notes: The table reports estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) for dummy variables denoting time periods relative to changes in direct democratic institutions.
The dependent variable is the log of canton expenditures. All specifications control for state and year fixed effects and the same canton characteristics as in column (3) of
Table 3. The p-values correspond to the F-statistics are shown in the last three columns)*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Table A3: Dynamic Effects of Direct Democracy on Government SpendingProbit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Expenditures T-2 0.019 0.034 -0.001 -0.007 -0.04 -0.023
(0.045) (0.013)** (0.004) (0.012) (0.050) (0.028)
Log Expenditures T-3 -0.014 -0.016 0.001 0.006 -0.023 0.012
(0.034) (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) (0.057) (0.031)
Log Expenditures T-5 -0.006 -0.018 0 0 0.001 0.021
(0.015) (0.010)* (0.000) (0.010) (0.041) (0.022)
Observations 225 2524 200 2524 1025 2524
R Squared 0.06 0.05 0.19
Log-likelihood -23.68 -19.7 -135.59
∆ Log Expenditures T-2 0 -0.007 0 -0.004 0.008 0
(0.004) (0.013) (0.000) (0.012) (0.055) (0.027)
∆ Log Expenditures T-3 0.017 0.029 0 -0.007 0.007 -0.024
(0.043) (0.013)** (0.000) (0.012) (0.053) (0.027)
Observations 225 2524 200 2524 1025 2524
R Squared 0.06 0.05 0.19
Log-likelihood -25.01 -19.83 -142.66
Table A4: Feedback Effects between Spending and Changes in Direct Democracy
Notes: The table reports estimates (marginal effects in the case of probit estimates in odd columns) where the dependent variables are
whether a mandatory budget referendum was adopted (columns (1) and (2)) or abolished (columns (3) and (4)) and changes in the signature
requirement for the voter initiative (columns (5) and (6)). The top panel includes log epxenditures two, three and five years prior to the change
in the institution. The bottom panel includes growth rates in expenditures two and three years prior to the institutional reform. All specifications
include canton and year effects as well as the same canton characteristics as in previous tables. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. 
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